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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
FAIRFIELD
PANY,

IRRIGATION

C 0 M-

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
7670

ERNEST CARSON A N D M R S .
ERNEST CARSON, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS IN ANSWER
TO RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR
RE-HEARING AND BRIEF
The unanimous decision of the Supreme Court having
determined this case in favor of appellants after full briefing and argument heretofore, the respondent has filed its
motion for a re-hearing and brief in support thereof. The
points raised are not only specifically. and fully covered by
the opinion of this Honorable Court, but have been repeatedly raised and argued by respondent throughout this
proceeding and there is nothing new which is contained in
its present petition and brief.
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ALL POINTS HAVE BEEN FULLY CONSIDERED
For example, the petition is based upon two points:
that the court erred in holding that the statutes in effect
prior to 1935 required anyone to make a statutory filing on
the waters in question in order to appropriate the same,
and that the court erred in holding that respondent was
not misled by the change in concept as to public water. Yet
these contentions were argued during the trial, in all of
the briefs, at the oral argument and fully covered in the
court's unanimous opinion. It is true that respondent's
position thereon has shifted several times but this serves
to emphasize the error of its contentions and does not detract from the fact that the points already have been fully
and properly considered.
There should be some end to argument and some point
at which a case is submitted and decided. At the oral argument in this case, counsel for respondent claimed that he
was taken by surprise by the fact that water originally
having its source underground loses its identity as underground water after it has been conveyed in a natural
channel with the natural flow of surface water and sought
to be diverted from a natural surface channel. The respondent accordingly· asked to file a "Supplemental Brief"
after the oral argument, which privilege was allowed it.
It covered in such "Supplemental Brief" following oral
argument almost the exact point it seeks to cover in its
· petition for a re-hearing, except that its arguments are
inconsistent.
As we pointed out in our answer to its supplemental
brief, after oral argument, the trial court found upon
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respondent's original contention that it had appropriated
the water by diversion from a natural channel as a part
of a larger stream prior to 1934 and after 1905. Then in
their supplemental brief, counsel for respondent contended
that the water in any event when and where it diverted
it was surface water that could only be appropriated by
application to the State Engineer. Now, it contends that
it was underground water which was appropriated by it
as underground water.
STATUTE DID NOT REQUIRE FILING ON
UNDERGROUND WATER AS SUCH, BUT DID
REQUIRE FILING ON WATER FLOWING IN
NATURAL CHANNELS IRRESPECTIVE OF
REMOTE ORIGIN.
We are led to wonder how respondent can disregard
the fact pointed out by the opinion of this Court, that the
Fairfield Irrigation Company never did seek to appropriate
underground water as such. How, in the face of the record,
can it blithely argue that it appropriated "underground
water" as such when the undisputed record is that it simply
diverted from the natural channel of Fairfield Springs such
amount of the well waters as were permitted to flow and
commingle with the spring waters. Just as well say that
on any surface stream after 1903 there can be an appropriation of its water by mere use because some of it somewhere up the stream had its source through springs, seeps,
wells or otherwise. This fallacious doctrine would destroy
all of our concepts and make impossible the administration
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of surface, as well as our underground, water by the State
Engineer.
The opinion of this Court completely answers the respondent's present argument by pointing out:
"Here the respondent did not own the land
where the artesian basin is located; it did not drill
the well which diverted the water from the basin;
it merely diverted such waters from a natural water
course after they had been permanently diverted
from the basin by the owners of the land drilling
an artificial well who had allowed the waters to run
to waste into a natural channel."
STATE ENGINEER HAD JURISDICTION OF
SURF ACE STREAMS FLOWING IN WELLDEFINED CHANNELS.
Respondent on page 2, et seq. of its brief claims "That
the Court has overlooked the fact that the ·statutes at all
times prior to 1935 did not purport to give the State Engineer jurisdiction over "underground ,water" and that during
said period every application on artesian water and percolaling water had been rejected. Respondent then argues
that since the State Engineer did not have jurisdiction
before 1935 to entertain applications for underground water,
that officer could not grant applications to appropriate
water flowing in natural channels on the surface if such
water sometime before it entered the natural channel had
a remote origin underground. The whole argument of
respondent is that it was exactly in the position of appellants in making use of these waters before 1935 which,
as pointed out in the opinion, is not so. Respondent used
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the water as a part of a surface stream after that water
had been commingled with other water. It never sought to
go beyond the natural channel, it had no connection whatsoever with any underground source.
The respondent confuses the issue again by arguing
that Riordan v. lV estwood, 203 P. 2d 922, held in effect
that underground water had always been public waters.
The opinion of this Court fully covers this phase as all
others. Really this changed concept, or whether it should
be applied before 1935, has nothing to do with the case,
since there has never been any change in the concept that
water flowing in well defined channels on the surface must
be treated as such, and not as underground waters, even
though such surface waters had a remote origin underground.
THIS COURT'S DECISION IS SOUND IN
HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT DID
NOT COME WITHIN THE DOCTRINE OF
THE HANSON CASE, WHICH CARSONS DID.
On page 3 of its brief, respondent argues that "to hold
that the 1903 statute requiring a filing on ground water
as the Court has done in the instant case, is to ascribe to
the Legislature the doing of a useless act in 1935." This
is an unjustified distortion of the decision in order to set
up a straw man. This Court did not hold that a filing was
necessary on u~derground water prior to 1935. It expressly
held in line with Hanson v. Salt Lake City, 205 P. 2d 255,
that a filing on underground water was not necessary but
that mere application to a beneficial use was sufficient and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
that since the Carsons as owners of the land and the pipe
directly used said water from the ground as underground
water, they completed a valid appropriation, whereas the
Fairfield Irrigation Company, not being the owner of the
land, never theretofore having asserted any control over
the underground water source, but merely having diverted
a portion of the well water from a natural channel after
it had been permitted by the landowner to run into said
natural channel over the surface of the ground and commingle with a large amount of other surface water, did
not make a valid appropriation of that water as underground water. All of the confusion which respondent seeks
to inject into this case is dissolved if this point is recognized, as this Court has recognized it, and respondent's
argument is based wholly on its false assumption that the
Court held that underground water could not be appropriated as such by usage.

RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT CONTRADICTS
ITSELF.
On page 4 of its brief, respondent seeks again to confuse the issue by belaboring the point that underground
water must be considered to always have been ·public waters
(which makes no difference in the decision of this case),
but respondent adds: "But only water in known or defined
channels was placed under the jurisdiction of the State
Engineer in 1903. The balance of these public waters (both
on public and private lands) could still be appropriated by
usage."
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Again respondent says on page 4 of its brief, "By the
statute in 1903 he (the State Engineer) was granted jurisdiction over streams and other sources of water in known
or defined channels." Thus even respondent must concede
that since 1903 water in known or defined channels could
not be appropriated by mere usage, but that the State
Engineer in 1903 was granted jurisdiction over streams
and other sources of water in known and defined channels.
When it is realized that the record is without dispute,
and this court has determined, that if there were in fact
any intention at all to divert the water in question by
Fairfield Irrigation Company it was from a stream flowing in a known and defined natural channel and that Fairfield Irrigation Company never made any diversion of the
water except from such stream flowing in a known and
defined natural channel, it must be apparent that respondent's entire argument is fallacious and has been properly
passed upon by this Court in the only manner the law
permits.
THE FALLACIOUS DOCTRINE NOW CONTENDED FOR BY RESPONDENT WOULD
THROW ALL WATER RIGHTS INTO CONFUSION.
Respondent continues that "The court has held against
us because we did not make a statutory filing prior to 1933.
We assert that none could have been made." It argues
that a filing would have been rejected. This is a fanciful
contention and it is not supported by a single case cited
by respondent; as a matter of fact, several of the cases
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cited by respondent as we shall see show that the application to appropriate streams in natural channels irrespective
of their remote source has ever since 1903 been considered
within the jurisdiction of the State Engineer. As a matter
of fact, between 1903 and 1935 you would eliminate from
the action of the State Engineer almost every one of the
numerous applications to appropriate surface streams which
have been granted, because in almost every instance they
have had their remote origin in whole or in part underground.
For instance, Provo River is now over-subscribed but
there have been numerous applications thereon approved
and proved up on since 1903. The river during various
stages of the flow is almost entirely made up by seepage,
percolating and other underground water, and as a matter
of fact, there is frequently a water-tight dam maintained
at Midway, all of the water used in .Utah County frequently
being made up from return flow, seepage and springs. If
the respondent is correct, applications to appropriate water
from Provo River between 1903 and 1935 afforded no jurisdiction for action by the State Engineer, or at least would
be ineffectual to authorize the use of water from this surface stream because it had a remote source underground.
This would mean that notwithstanding applications filed
on Provo River between 1903 and 1935 fully subscribing
for all available water flowing therein, including applications of the United States Government, a third party now
could file on various seeps and springs contributing to the
surface flow on the ground that the natural channel filings
theretofore made were without jurisdiction and ineffectual.
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If this were the case, our water rights on every major
stream in the state would be thrown into hopeless confusion. Yet this is what respondent's argument amounts
to. If it could not file on the surface water flowing in Fairfield Springs prior to 1903 because part of it had its remote
source underground, then all of our surface filings from
known and defined channels between 1903 and 1935 would
be in question and in jeopardy.
THE OPINION OF THE COURT IS PRACTICAL AND SOUND.
On the other hand, if the decision of this Court is
correct, as it is, order and justice are given effect. We
submit that there can be no question of the practicality,
justice and legality of this Court's determination in this
case that:
"Respondent's predecessors did not own the land
on which the wells are located, nor do they divert
this water from the artesian basin. The driller of
the wells diverted the water and later abandoned it
and allowed it to run to waste into a natural water
course and to commingle with the natural waters of
the springs from which respondent's predecessors
diverted it into their canal to a beneficial use .. There
is little difference between this situation and the
case where water, after being once appropriated and
used, is allowed to escape beyond the control of the
original appropriator into a natural water course.
The law is now settled in this state that in such case
such waters are subject to being again appropriated
by filing an application and diversion to a beneficial
use and not otherwise. Justesen v. Olsen, supra;
Lehi Irri. Co. v. Jones,
Utah . . . , 202 P. 2d 892 ;
McNaughton v. Eaton, ... Utah ... , ... P. 2d ....
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In those cases only such waters were held to be
subject to reappropriation as reached the natural
channel or course from which it could be rediverted
but the new appropriator could not obtain any· right
against the original appropriator to require him to
waste his waters or make them available for use
under the new appropriation. Lasson v. Seely, ...
Utah ... , 238 P. 2d 418; Smithfield West Bench
Irr. Co. v. Union Central Ins. Co., 105 Utah 468, 142
P. 2d 866, on second appeal 113 Utah 356, 195 P.
2d 249 ; Crescent Mining Co. v. Silver King Mining
Company, 17 Utah 444. The difference between those
cases and this one is that here the waters have been
abandoned and the original appropriator has lost
his right to interfere with the appellants' use of t~e
waters. If the original appropriator had not abandoned or by non-user lost his rights to these waters
and still could make a beneficial use of them and
could thereby prevent the reappropriator from using
them, the situation would be the same as in those
cases. Under our concept of the law of artesian
basins prior to 1935, no one could by appropriation
and beneficial use acquire a right to such waters
as against the owner of the land on which the basin
was located but if the land owner allowed it to run
to waste and it found its way to a natural water
course it could be appropriated in the manner prescribed by law and as against every one but the
owner of the lands where the basin was located such
appropriator would obtain the right to the use thereof. Under ·the new concept, the only difference is
that such waters are subject to appropriation in
accordance with the law even as against the land
owners where the artesian basin is located; it' did
not drill the well whick diverted the water from the
basin; it merely diverted such waters from a natural
water course after they had been permanently diverted from the basin by the owner of the land

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

drilling an artificial well who had allowed the waters
to run to ~vaste into a natural channel. (Emphasis
ours.)
"In the Hanson case, supra, we held that the
right to the use of artesian well waters, which prior
to 1935 were considered not subject to appropriation
but by the Wrathall and Justesen cases were held
to be subject to appropriation, could be acquired
prior to that time by merely diverting such watersto a beneficial use and the filing of an application to
appropriate was not necessary. In the Hanson case,
the owner of the land on which the well was located
had drilled the well and beneficially used the water
for many years; it did not involve an appropriation
by a person who was not the owner of the land on
which the well water was diverted from the artesian
basin. Since respondent and their predecessors could
have appropriated these waters in the statutory·
manner prior to 1935 under the old conception, they
have not been misled by the old concept into not.
filing an application to appropriate these waters
during the time that they used them from 1905 to
1933 and therefore they do not come under the exception announced in the Hanson case, and did not
acquire the right to use these waters prior to 1933.n
T H E RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION I S
BASED UPON INCORRECT ASSUMPTIONS.
On page 6, et seq. of its brief, the respondent contends
that the cases prior to the Riordan case uniformly held
that this water could not have been filed on by respondent.
The decision of this Court cites a number of cases showing·
that this proposition is not valid, and further, this Court's
opinion pin-points the very basis of respondent's confusion
when it shows that the only difference between the new

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
.and old concepts as to public or private water is that underground waters under the new concept are subject to appropriation by application to the State Engineer even as
.against the landowner where the artesian basin is located.
Both under the old and new concepts one appropriating
water from a natural surface channel had to file an appli·Cation with the State E'ngineer, but under the old concept
he could not require the owner of the land to continue to
let his water run off· and under the new concept, h~ could.
In either event the appropriator could acquire no rights
·unless he filed an application with the State Engineer or
diverted and used the water as unaerground water, rather
than as a part of a surface stream flowing in a well defined channel.
The respondent, prior to appellants' appropriation,
neither filed an application nor diverted and used the water
from its underground source. It simply diverted the water
from a natural channel as a part of a larger surface stream
or water course. If this fact is kept in mind it will be seen
that not one case has respondent cited which sustains its
argument.
RESPONDENT'S AUTHORITIES DO NOT SUP-·
PORT ITS POSITION.
We invite attention to the authorities respondent cites
in an attempt to show that it was misled because up to
1935 it could not have filed on these surface waters which
it diverted from the natural channel of the Fairfield
·.Springs. It has been misled in no way but has, itself,
.sought to mislead the Carsons by suddenly seeking to de-
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prive them of their water after conceding their ownership
ever since 1931, and up until shortly before this action was
filed.
Willow Creek v. Michaelsen, 21 Utah 248, 60 Pac. 943,
is referred to. This was decided prior to 1903. It did not
involve any application to the State Engineer or the question of jurisdiction of the State Engineer. It simply held
that a lower claimant could not force an· upper landowner
to allow percolating waters to leave the owner's land when
it could be utilized by the owner. The respondent argues
that this water could not have been filed on. What the
cases it cites proves was that this water could have been
filed on if from a natural channel, but that prior to 1935
the filing could not have been used to compel its continued
flow into the natural water course as against the landowner.
Whether under the old or new concept, however, the respondent could have filed on the water, but it made no
attempt or claim until long after appellants had validly appropriated the water as underground water. The appellants'
use, both under the old and new concept, constituted a
valid appropriation-under the old because it was the landowners' water to begin with; under the new concept, because its application of the waters as underground waters
to a beneficial use comprised a valid appropriation by
virtue of the doctrine of the Hanson case.
Next, respondent cites Crescent Mining Co. v. Silver
King Mining Co., 17 Utah 444, 54 Pac. 244. In this case,
decided in 1898, contrary to what respondent says in its
brief, the user of water from the. natural lake into which
the developed waters flowed, was held to have appropriated
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such water as water of a lake or pond, just as respondent
could have appropriated the water from Fairfield Springs
by application to the State Engineer, but it was further
held that such appropriation did not give the lower user
an easement in the tunnel or the right to have the developed
water to continue to flow as against the owner of the land
on which it was developed. Moreover, this did not involve
in any way the jurisdiction of the State Engineer. The
only point material to this case is that when the developed
water flowed into the natural lake it was held subject to
appropriation as waters flowing in a natural channel, but
not as underground waters so as to require their continued
discharge into the lake. Thus, this demonstrates that it
makes no difference whether the old concept or new concept is applied. Underground waters prior to 1935 did not
have to be filed on whether considered public or private
waters, but if they had lost their identity as underground
waters and had commingled with waters flowing in a natural water course, they were subject to appropriation.
Petersen v. Eureka Hill Mining Co., 53 Utah 70, 176
Pac. 729, is cited by respondent in support of its contention that developed water prior to 1935 was not under the
jurisdiction of the State Engineer. This case is not in point
since there was an attempt not to appropriate water flowing in a well defined natural channel but developed wa~er
as such. The quotation contained in respondent's brief was
mere dicta and even this is consistent with this Court's
opinion. The express holding, however,. is that prior to
the plaintiff's application, the waters of the spring had
been fully appropriated by defendant. We quote the portion
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of the opinion immediately preceding that portion extracted
by counsel ( p. 730) :

"* * * Under the facts as found and which
for the purposes of this opinion must be taken as
true, the defendant appropriated the waters of the
spring in question and applied them to a beneficial
use while the soil upon which the spring was located
was still a part of the public domain. This it had a
legal right to do. 2 Kinney, Irrigation, etc. (2d Ed.)
Para. 648."
The respondent next cites Deseret Livestock v.
Hooppiania, 66 Utah 25, 239 Pac. 479, a leading case which
not only fails to support respondent's position but was appropriately cited by this Court as a foundation of its opinion. We can do no better than to quote respondent's description of the case (p. 9 of its brief) with our emphasis
added:
"* * * In the Deseret Livestock case, twelve
springs were involved. Several of the springs yielded
a sufficient flow to form a well defined channeL
The remainder did not. Deseret made a statutory
filing on all of the waters, i. e., those which formed
a channel and those which did not. Hooppiania had
been using both classes of water prior to the filing.
As to the water in defined channels, the Court held
that the filing with the State Engineer prevailed and
that a filing was indispensable to initiate a right.
As to the waters which did not form a channel the
Court held that the filing was ineffectual. In other
words, the State Engineer was compelled to refuse
to take jurisdiction over percolating waters."
Where does this leave the argument of respondent that
it could not have filed an application with the State EngiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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neer prior to 1935? Its diversion was out of, from and
below the natural channel of the Fairfield Spring:s-not at
the wells, but after the water from the wells had run down
a channel which the Court found had been cut thereby
and from there into the Fairfield Spring pond, where they
commingled with a large amount of other water, and from
thence into the natural channel of the Fairfield Springs
from which diversions were made for irrigation. Respondent cannot claim that the spring water itself had to be
the sole agency in creating the channel. We quote from
the Hooppiania case (p. 481) :
"It is very doubtful whether much or any of
the water of the springs, other than springs No. 11
and No. 12, ever found its way into any natural
channel, but it is conceded that whatever water
from those springs did find its way into either of
the natural channels had been appropriated and applied to a beneficial use by the predeces~or in interest of appellant."
Certainly respondent's use and claim was from a natural
channel and according to its own statement of the Hooppiana case it could have filed its application which was in
respondent's wordE;, "indispensible to initiate a right." Certainly Carson's diversion prior to 1935 was not from any
natural channel but directly from the underground water
source through their own pi pes. Therein is the deciding
distinction which respondent seems unable or unwilling
to recognize. As indicated by the opinion of the Court, the
Carsons filed their under water claim as a claimant to
underground water:
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"From December 30, 1933 to August 1, 1937r
appellants leased these well waters to the Manning
Gold Mining Company, which pumped the entire
flow to its mining and milling operations where all
of such waters were beneficially used. This use commenced a little more than a year before the Wrathall
and Justesen cases and the 1935 statutes and amendments. At the time when these changes in concepts
occurred, appellants were the owners of the land on
which the wells were located, they were the owners
of the pipes and casings of the wells which diverted
the waters from the artesian basin, and they werein possession of the diverting works and actually
beneficially using the waters through their lessee._
Under our concept prior to the 1935 change, they
had the right to use those waters as they saw fit
without filing an application to appropriate them
and they had done everything that the law anticipated that they should do iri order to acquire the
ownership of those waters. On March 23, 1936,
appellants filed in the State Engineer's Office an
Underground Water Claim claiming the right to theuse of these well waters pursuant to S. L. 1935, c.
105, sec. 100-5-12, thereby fully complying with all
the statutory provisions in regard to such waters.
and indicating that they did not intend to abandon
the right to the use of such waters, and the pumping
operation to Manning continued for more than a
year after such filing. * * *"
The case of Holman v. Christensen, 73 Utah 389, 274
Pac. 457, is cited with the statement emphasized by respondent that the opinion "* * * did not hold that
wate.r which was caused to run from the land by other
than natural means was subject to appropriation." What
the Supreme Court actually said was, "Other than through
a natural channel" (P. 459). As a matter of fact the right.
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to appropriate from a natural channel water arising from
a spring on private land above was upheld. The Christensen case entirely refutes respondent's reasoning in this case.
The last case referred to by respondent, Wrathall v.
Johnson, 86 Utah 50, 40 P. 2d 755, does not support respondent's contention and this Court in its opinion takes
proper notice thereof.
RESPONDENT IN NO WAY MISLED
Respondent was in no sense misled. It did not intend
to claim any underground water. It filed no underground
water claim. Its officers and all involved made no contention whatsoever that they had any interest in the wells and
conceded the rights and use of the Carsons, and the first
.suggestion of any claim by the irrigation company of the
wells was shortly before this action commenced (Tr. 33-34,
54-55, 72, 89, 94, 179, 188-192, 201, 204, 219, 275-276, 298301, 334, 336-337, 269, 273, 394-395; defendants' ex. 1, 6,
14; probate file 5366) . Not only was the respondent not
misled, but by acquiescence in Carson's ownership of the
waters for over twenty years has established that its present efforts to appropriate the water are a mere afterthought.
The company's argument that it could not have appropriated the waters prior to 1935 and that therefore the
Carsons, contrary to the Hanson case should be denied the
water notwithstanding that they did everything which the
Hanson case says they should have done to complete an
appropriation of underground water would serve merely to
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deprive a rightful owner because the respondent did not
bring himself within the rule on which the owner's right
is based. If respondent had paid for the wells, bought the
land and pipe, used the water from the well as underground
water and filed its underground water claim as did the
Carsons, it could now claim with some logic that the same
rule applied to it as to the Carsons. It should not be permitted to work the same result by its present argument.
UNDER NEITHER THE OLD OR NEW CONCEPT CAN RESPONDENT PREVAIL.
Respondent convinced the trial court and argued on
appeal in the first instance that we must treat our present
concepts the same as if they had always existed, and now
goes right back to the early cases in an effort to entirely
destroy any such result but to establish that percolating
water belongs to the owner of the soil and was not subject
to appropriation prior to the changing of our concepts
in 1935. The trouble with its position is that if we go back
to the old concept, it cannot succeed because Carsons then
would own the water as owners of the soil. And if we do
not go back to the old concept, it cannot succeedI because
/ .
Carsons were the first after the water was abandoned by
Sunshine Water Co. subsequent to 1905, who diverted and
used the water as underground water and thus appropriated it in the manner recognized at that time, and, in the
manner recognized in the Hanson case.
Respondent has cited cases involving springs in an
attempt to show that it could not have filed an application
to appropriate water after it entered the spring channel.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20
Does respondent contend that Fairfield Spring was not
subject to appropriation by usage prior to 1903 as it seems
to· argue that the Michaelson case indicates? If its argument is correct, it never did acquire title to the six or
seven second feet comprising Fairfield Springs and it has
for these many years belonged to the owners of the soil on
which the springs arise-Carsons. If the Carsons were as
determined to cause trouble for the irrigation company on
its rights as the irrigation company is to cause trouble to
them on theirs, the Carsons could take respondent's own
argument and make a very good case that they own all of
the Fairfield Springs. This just goes to show the soundness of this Court's determination, and the difficulty and
confusion that the respondent's position would entail. We
qo not deny that prior to 1903 the predecessors of the company perfected a diligence right by appropriation from the
natural channel below Fairfield Springs. It cannot claim
that its predecessors could make an appropriation by diligence prior to 1903 from the natural channel below the
spring and then convincingly argue that it could not have
filed an application based on a diversion from the same
channel after 1903.
Every consideration has been given to respondent's
shifting arguments. Any modification of the present opinion would add confusion to a sound, able and practical inN
terpretation of the law. Any departure from it as urged
by respondent would throw our water rights into question,
as well as the Utah water law into confusion.
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CONCLUSION
'

Perhaps any argument other than to refer to the opinion of the Court has been superfluous. The opinion speaks
for itself. The decision of the Court is wholly consistent
with prior adjudications and in furtherance of justice. To
adopt respondent's changing arguments in its stead would
throw most water rights into confusion, including perhaps
respondent's own proper rights in the Fairfield Springs
and would work a positive wrong against the Carsons who
have already been subjected too long to grief and expense,
which they can ill afford, in standing up for their rights
in these small wells.
Respondent's petition for rehearing should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
A. SHERMAN CHRISTENSON,
CHRISTENSON AND
CHRISTENSON,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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